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Kelly’s opposition to phenomenology seems to assign to this philosophical stance the 
same fate suffered by his theory when it is assimilated to different and incompatible systems. 
In the passages quoted in the first part of our work (Armezzani & Chiari, 2014) one can see 
how he managed to blame phenomenology for particularistic subjectivism, idealism and logical 
positivism at the same time. It is the destiny of all new and difficult ideas. 
How it happened to Kelly, so Husserl had frequently to denounce prejudices and misin-
terpretations surrounding his thought. In The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental 
Phenomenology (1936), at that point elderly, at once with the pride for having “introduced 
phenomenology in history”, expresses his deep bitterness for having being already misunder-
stood many times, and for these misunderstandings put forward a reason which could be still 
valid: “One goes to seek advice from my disciples […] and saves oneself the trouble of study-
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ing my writings, undoubtedly very difficult”1. Also Kelly’s writings are hardly easy to read and 
understand adequately, and this makes our work difficult. It seems almost clear, however, that 
Kelly happened to know distorted versions of Husserl’s thought, and that as a result his meet-
ing with phenomenology has been missed. 
What we would like to maintain here is that personal construct theory (PCT) shows not 
only important similarities with phenomenology, as already suggested by other authors (Butt, 
1998a, 1998b, 2003, 2004; Epting, 1988; Warren, 1998) and by ourselves (Armezzani, 2010; 
Chiari & Nuzzo, 2004, 2010), but even that Kellyan theory represents in many respects an un-
aware realisation of the Husserlian project. In order to uphold this thesis, it is necessary to re-
cover Husserl’s scientific project (after having read his very difficult writings), and highlight 
how this style of thought and analysis has been gone along in the construction of PCT in spite 
of its explicit rejection. 
In this connection it is interesting to note the similar stand taken by Varela, who put back 
the Husserlian phenomenology on the scientific stage with the foundation of his neurophenom-
enology (1996, 1998). In his previous book written in collaboration with Thompson and Rosch 
(1991), Husserl had been criticised for his solipsism, his reductionism and his representation-
alism, and depreciated for his excess of theoreticism. Some time later Thompson (2007) with-
drew honestly these accusations, justifying them with the scanty knowledge of Husserl and the 
influence of an interpretation of phenomenology offered by Dreyfus and Harrison (1982): 
I now believe (i) that Husserl was not a methodological solipsist; (ii) that was greatly 
concerned with the intersubjective and embodied aspects of experience; (iii) that his theory 
of intentionality was not a representational theory; and (iv) that his theory of the life-world 
was not reductionistic and representationalist. (Thompson, 2007, p. 414) 
As to Kelly, he did not have second thoughts (or maybe he did not have the time for that), 
but this does not jeopardize the possibility of seeing, beyond the subjective intentions, how a 
certain cognitive attitude can lead to parallel paths of knowledge and shared outcomes, even 
though contexts, purposes and languages are very different. Of course, these differences remain 
and are very clear. Husserl is a German philosopher and Kelly a psychologist who portrays 
well the American tradition of logical pragmatism; Husserl wants to go back to the origins of 
knowledge, Kelly is content with providing a theory useful to a certain range of convenience. 
 But our comparison is a view between the lines which shows up similarities beyond the 
first sight, trying not to misrepresent the originality and peculiarity of both the perspectives. 
The interest for the ways of human knowledge, the rediscovery of experience, and the recur-
sive game between particularity and generality, are the core of the present face-to-face between 
Husserl and Kelly. The third part of our contribution will focus on clinical aspects and will see 
PCT compared with hermeneutics and the contributions of the phenomenological stance. 
Though aware of the impossibility of condensing phenomenology in few paragraphs and 
of exhausting the comprehensiveness of Kellyan theory with some quotations, we hope that 
this attempt, even though risky, helps to throw light on certain core areas of the Husserlian 
thought in order to allow an interpretation of PCT under this light, and to propose the occasion 
for a comparison open to other contributions. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  This passage from The Crisis of European Sciences appears in appendix XIII, not included in the 
English translation. We translated into English the Italian edition of the work.	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The project of a science of experience 
Husserl’s project is the foundation of a strenge Wissenschaft, a rigorous science, alto-
gether different from the naturalistic one: a science of experience that, for its fidelity to “the 
lived”, will have to adopt “a wholly new point of departure and a wholly new method, a 
method that distinguishes it in principle from every ‘natural’ science” (1907, Engl. transl., p. 
20). The scientific program takes form as “the scientific opening-up of the life-world” (Hus-
serl, 1936, Engl. transl., p. 128), and “its execution implies the creation of a new science of a 
peculiar sort” (p. 146). 
The life-world (Lebenswelt) is “what is always taken for granted in all human life, always 
familiar to us in its typology through experience” (Husserl, 1936, Engl. transl., p. 123): the 
layer of lived experience preceding naturalistic constructions, and that has never been object of 
scientific inquiry. 
“There is never been a scientific inquiry into the way in which the life-world constantly 
functions as subsoil” (1936/1970, p.124). “No one ever thinks about the predications and 
truths which precede science, about the ‘logic’ which provides norms within this sphere of 
relativity” (1936, Engl. transl., p. 135). “Is not it possible, […] by a new attitude, to take in 
the life-world at a glance, and to resolve to know it for what it is in its own mutability, 
relativity, making of it the object of a science?” (1936)1 
The need for a science of experience arises from a deep dissatisfaction for the proposals 
offered by positivism and idealism. “Normal” sciences have failed in giving answers to the 
more radical questions because have been edified on the prejudice of an outer reality independ-
ent of the subject, and neglected to take into consideration that “wonderful correlation” be-
tween consciousness and world (Husserl, 1907, Engl. transl., p. 68) which is human experi-
ence. It is therefore necessary to restart from the origins of knowledge and refound on this ba-
sis a coherent method. Without such fundamental question about the how of knowledge, “all 
natural science is naïve in regard to its point of departure” (Husserl, 1911, Engl. transl., p. 85). 
In order to find the layer of original experience Husserl asks for the practice of epoché: 
the bracketing of prejudices and acquisitions taken for granted. Epoché is a “methodic expedi-
ent” (1912-1929, Engl. transl., p. 58) to be used “to free of the strongest and most universal, 
and at the same time most hidden, internal bond” (1936, Engl. transl., p. 151) and to “set aside 
all hitherto prevailing habits of thinking” (1912-1929, Engl. transl., p. xix).	  It is a “vocational 
attitude” (1936, Engl. transl., p. 136) able to reveal what we should know all the time: that our 
view of things is necessarily perspective, and that our knowledge is inside experience. 
Epoché is anything but a denial of reality. Husserl always rejected the philosophical tra-
dition which “plays” with the possibility of the real: “there is” a world, and if it asks for being 
enlightened with regard to its meaning, does not tolerate of being questioned about its being. 
While we put into parentheses the thesis of a world, in fact, “all that has been ‘put out of play’ 
remains for us, here as elsewhere, preserved in the bracketing-modification” (Husserl, 1912-
1929, Engl. transl., p. 183). Rather than moving us away from the world, phenomenological 
reduction gives us it back in its original form, revealing the prejudices of previous construc-
tions. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  The translation of the third quotation is ours, since the English translation does not include paragraph 
XVII	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If one considers this methodological and instrumental function of epoché, the scientific 
implications implied will appear clearer. Through the “bracketing” of the obvious, the field of 
phenomena and meanings, the life world that naturalistic science has never explored, discloses. 
Husserl therefore does not contrast naturalism with a renewed version of the “spiritual 
sciences” and, least of all, with philosophical idealism: 
Not a subjective idealism (1912-1929, Engl. transl., p. 128) [Husserl almost seems to reply to 
Kelly]. If anyone reading our statements objects that they mean changing all the world into 
subjective illusion and committing oneself to a “Berkeleyan idealism” we can only answer 
that he has not seized upon the sense of those statements. […] The real actuality is not 
“reinterpreted”, to say nothing of its being denied; it is rather that a countersensical 
interpretation of the real actuality, i.e. an interpretation which contradicts the latter’s own 
sense as clarified by insight, is removed. (p. 129) 
To the phenomenologist, the world is not “a figment of his imagination” as Kelly 
(1965/1969, p. 219) wrote, but the real correlate of our knowledge, inseparable from it: 
The world, however, never is a thinker’s experience. To refer to the world may be an 
experience, but the world itself is the object intended. It is immaterial, from the point of view 
of our distinction, what attitude one takes up to the question of the make-up of objective 
being, of the true, real inner being of the world or of any other object. (Husserl, 1900, Engl. 
transl., p. 223) 
What Merleau-Ponty (1945) translates into this meaningful assertion: “We must not […] 
wonder whether we really perceive a world, we must instead say: the world is what we per-
ceive” (Engl. transl., p. xviii). 
The rediscovery of the fundamental correlation between knowledge and world dissolves 
the realism/idealism antinomy, and brings the term “reality” back to the meaning of an actual 
“making experience” of things. To study experience scientifically means, substantially, having 
no longer as objects the data of nature meant as independent from the subject, but the phenom-
ena, that is, “the manner in which each type of objects is present to us” (Husserl, 1900, Engl. 
transl., p. 135). 
In order to understand what a phenomenon is one must break away from the idea of an 
objective reality distinct from the person who grasps it. Actually, the phenomenon is prior to 
all distinctions. There is no “external” phenomenon which presents itself to consciousness: the 
phenomenon is this very presentation. The practice of epoché is used for removing the mistake 
which makes us distinguish the thing from its manifestation. 
It is a serious error to draw a real (reell) distinction between “merely immanent” or 
“intentional” objects, on the one hand, and “transcendent”, “actual” objects, which may 
correspond to them on the other. […] It need only be said to be acknowledged that the 
intentional object of a presentation is the same as its actual object, and on occasion as its 
external object, and that it is absurd to distinguish between them. (Husserl, 1900, Engl. 
transl., p. 240) 
 Naturalistic objectivity is a delusion: like von Foerster (1974) stated in more recent 
times, “objectivity is the delusion that observations could be made without an observer”. 
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The first consequence of this discovery is the recognition that any representation is a 
phenomenon, a real experience, even when the object of representation is non-existent. If I rep-
resent the god Jupiter – Husserl (1900) writes – the mental object is not real, but  
this does not prevent our-idea-of-the-god-Jupiter from being actual, a particular sort of 
experience or particular mode of mindedness […] If, however, the intended object exists, 
nothing becomes phenomenologically different. It makes no essential difference to 
consciousness whether it exists, or is fictitious, or is perhaps completely absurd. (Engl. 
transl., p. 216) 
We shall see later on that Kelly takes a similar position as to the reality of phenomena. 
Even though not justified in the same analytical and radical ways in which Husserl deals with 
the question, this crucial epistemological deviation seems to be at the basis even of Kellyan 
philosophy, constructive alternativism, and the fundamental postulate of his theory. It is plain 
that also for Kelly the theme has changed compared to naturalistic psychologies: no more data, 
but meanings. Only on this basis it is possible to assert that “all of our present interpretations of 
the universe are subject to revision or replacement” (Kelly, 1955, p. 15) and that people do not 
react to objective stimuli, but anticipate events. The very same notion of personal construct 
implies the unmissable relationship between subject and world, which is the condition for 
dealing with meanings and interpretation. 
Even though Kelly did not succeed in overcoming the realism/idealism opposition and 
kept the ontological distinction between events and constructs, he is nevertheless disposed to 
give the latter a status of reality which no naturalist would allow. Actually, the passage quoted 
in the first part of our work as a proof of his dualistic stance ends with a significant statement: 
The summary answer to our question of whether or not constructs are real is that a construct 
is indeed real, but its reality is not identical with the factual elements in its context. […] Its 
reality is not their reality. The construct has its own reality. (Kelly, 1955, p. 136) 
“The construct has its own reality”; and it is on this very reality that Kelly concentrates 
his inquiry, not on the reality of factual events. The same reality that Husserl assigns to phe-
nomenological studies: 
The phenomenologist defines as reality something completely different compared to the 
researcher of natural sciences. Their topic is basically different, corresponding to a different 
attitude. The naturalist investigates nature which shows itself in consciousness, but not the 
showing consciousness. He investigates the objective elements which show themselves, not 
the showing or the manifestation in itself, as lived experience of consciousness. (Husserl, 
1911-1921, Ital. transl. 2007, p. 58)1 
In Husserl, the scientific alternative to naturalism defines itself clearly as the rigorous 
study of lived experience, of this reality neglected by scientists which also Kelly, though 
keeping the dualism, chooses as his own subject. At this point, it is inevitable that the change 
of subject demands a coherent change in methods and aims. By following the developments of 
phenomenology on this methodological path, we could discover surprising echos with Kellyan 
theory, placed on a submerged level and never explicitly thematized. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1 The translation from Italian is ours.	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A new idea of objectivity 
According to Husserl (1911), once the experience devoid of prejudices has been recov-
ered, it is a matter of constructing on that a rigorous science, “a radical science, rising from 
below, based on sure foundation and progressing according to the most rigorous methods” 
(Engl. transl., p. 142). In this phenomenological science the subjective reference is unavoida-
ble, in a radical sense: it is not possible to give up it because it does not depend on an arbitrary 
choice, but on the structural manner of knowledge. For this same reason, it is necessary to 
abandon once and for all the idea of an objective science as meant by naturalism, and refound a 
“sensed” science or, as phenomenological scientists say today, “a science of consciousness as 
if experience mattered” (Varela, 1998), or a “science as if situation mattered” (Bitbol, 2002). 
No doubt that when Husserl speaks of scientificity he is thinking of an “objective” 
knowledge, in the sense of universally valid and communicable, and is thinking also of a useful 
knowledge, in the sense that it must contribute to the transformation of reality. In the meaning 
of the word “science”, those attributes which generally refer to it remain. The “particularism” 
which Kelly (1955) regards as “the bane of the phenomenologists” (p. 318) was actually as 
much countered by Husserl who, since his first work (1907), took sides against relativism, psy-
chologism, and the particularistic worldviews: 
Phenomenological judgments, as singular judgments, are not terribly instructive. But how do 
we acquire judgments, especially scientifically valid judgments? The word " scientific, " 
however, immediately places us in a predicament. (Engl. transl., p. 37) 
If scientificity is equated with naturalistic objectivity, phenomenology is destined to keep 
out of it forever. And yet, without leaving experience, it is possible “to conceive of knowledge 
that can not only bring particulars, but also universals, universal objects, and universal states of 
affairs to absolute givenness. This knowledge is of crucial significance for the possibility of 
phenomenology (Engl. transl., p. 39). 
It is crucial, in order that phenomenology can be considered a science, to conceive a dif-
ferent idea of objectivity: an idea arising from the evidence of invariant general structures oc-
curring in experience. Such general structures are called by Husserl essences (eidos), and there 
is no doubt that the term has gone a long way towards suggesting an idealistic stance. Even 
though he has made clear time after time that his meaning of “essence” should be freed from 
old philosophical sediments, and that “intuiting essences conceals no more difficulties or 
‘mystical’ secrets than does perception” (Husserl, 1911, Engl. transl., p. 181), it was almost 
unavoidable that this part of phenomenology became the most disregarded from scientists, not 
only naturalistic1, so not allowing the realisation of the phenomenological project. 
This was however the very decisive step for the foundation of a science of experience. 
“But of course we are restricting ourselves to the sphere of singular individuals, so we can't get 
much underway with these kinds of judgments. Only when we construct general judgments of 
essence do we attain the secure objectivity required by science” (Husserl, 1907, Engl. transl., p. 
51). 
Here Husserl agrees with Kelly as to the fruitlessness of solipsism, but it is exactly be-
cause the aim is the attainment of a “secure objectivity” that the intuition of essence does not 
bring any metaphysical expectation along: it is enough to come back to experience to realise 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1 Jaspers (1913) himself, the initiator of phenomenological psychopathology, refused to take into 
consideration the intuition of essence and supported phenomenology as empirical procedure.	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that only “the spell of inborn naturalism […] makes it so difficult for all of us to see ‘essences’ 
or ‘ideas’ – or rather, since in fact we do, so to speak, constantly see them, for us to let them 
have the peculiar value which is theirs instead of absurdly naturalizing them” (Husserl, 1911, 
Engl. transl., p. 110). 
Whenever we look at an object we see, together with the individual and concrete thing, 
certain “essential” characteristics which constitute it. If this applies to any perceived object (a 
house, a table, a bridge), applies also to those experiences presenting themselves as “inner” (a 
fear, a desire, a memory): each time, the particular experience brings along its essential form, 
which allows us to recognise other experiences of the same kind. The relationship between 
general and particular in lived experience is not a relationship of exclusion, but of mutual in-
telligibility, a recursive relationship happening in the stream of knowledge. The following pas-
sage makes clear the question very well: 
Certainly its own specific character is such that intuition of essence has as its basis a 
principal part of intuition of something individual […] Certainly, in consequence of that, no 
intuition of essence is possible without the free possibility of turning one’s regard to a 
corrisponding individual and forming a consciousness of an example – just as, conversely, no 
intuition of something individual is possible without the free possibility of bringing about an 
ideation […]. To the essential difference between the intuitions there corresponds the 
essential relationship between “existence” (here obviously in the sense of individual factual 
existent) and essence. Following up such interconnection with insight we seize upon the 
conceptual essences which correspond to these terms and will be firmly attached to them 
from now on; and thus all the semi-mystical thoughs clinging particularly to the concept 
Eidos (idea) and essence will remain cleanly separate from them. (Husserl, 1912-1929, Engl. 
transl., pp. 10-11) 
In order to convince that his proposal is hardly scandalous, Husserl (1912-1929) often re-
sorts to the analogy with geometry and mathematics, defined “old highly developed eidetic 
disciplines” (Engl. transl., p. 160). What phenomenology and mathematical sciences share is 
their having as subject the essential meanings and the conditions of their relations rather than 
“things of nature”. If I see a square table, I see at the same time its structural organisation (the 
identical length of the sides, the closure, the regularity of the angles) which allows me to rec-
ognise it in essential way and re-recognise when I meet other square objects, even though real-
ised with different materials1. 
In a similar way phenomenological research addresses the general regularities directly 
graspable in the configuration of data, and will be able to apply the essential knowledge in em-
pirical sciences by proceeding “like the geometer in the freedom and purity of his geometrical 
intuition” (Husserl, 1912-1929, Engl. transl., p. 360). 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1 It would deserve a study apart the similarity between Husserlian ideas and the definition of organisation 
and structure in Maturana’s and Varela’s (1980, 1984) theory of autopoiesis. According to the authors the 
organisation of anything is “those relations that must be present in order for something to exist. For me to 
judge that this object is a chair, I have to recognize a certain relationship between the parts I call legs, 
back, and seat, in such a way that sitting down is made possible. That it is made of wood and nails, or 
plastic and screws, has nothing at all to do with my classifying it as a chair. This situation, in which we 
recognize implicitly or explicitly the organization of an object when we indicate it or distinguish it, is 
universal in the sense that it is something we do constantly as a basic cognitive act” (Maturana & Varela, 
1984, Engl. transl., pp. 42-43). Chiari (in press) has shown recently the similarities between the theory of 
autopoiesis and PCT.	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It is like construing a geography starting from the real experience of the landscape1, as far 
as putting forward a mathesis of Erlebnisse (lived experiences) (Husserl,	   1912-1929, Engl. 
transl., p. 169), which will never have the same exactness of mathematical sciences, but will be 
able to assure the construction of a science of experience: 
That the “essences” grasped in essential intuition permit, at least to a very great extent, of 
being fixed in definitive concepts and thereby afford possibilities of definitive and in their 
own way absolutely valid objective statements, is evident to anyone free of prejudice. 
(Husserl, 1911, Engl. transl., p. 111) 
 It is necessary that the invariant structures with which phenomena present themselves 
stand the test of all the possible variations in order to accomplish this task of systematisation of 
phenomenological concepts. The method of “free variation” suggested by Husserl for the 
search of essences is described in this way: 
It is based on the modification of an experienced or imagined objectivity, turning it into an 
arbitrary example which, at the same time, receives the character of a guiding "model,” a 
point of departure for the production of an infinitely open multiplicity of variants. […] It then 
becomes evident that a unity runs through this multiplicity of successive figures, that in such 
free variations of an original image, e.g., of a thing, an invariant is necessarily retained as the 
necessary general form, without which an object such as this thing, as an example of its kind, 
would not be thinkable at all. (Husserl, 1948, Engl. transl., p. 340-341) 
 This is what happens in the life-world: the “structural invariants” of phenomena do not 
derive from a laborious inductive process, but from an immediate appearance of essences in 
single perceptions. The first time I experience fear is enough to let me know “what fear is in 
essence”, but the variations of examples, real or imaginary, make clear to me its “structural in-
variants” through an intersubjective and dialogical comparison leading to the only possible 
objectivity of human phenomena. 
 Dialogical interaction is necessary for this science of phenomena since it is the very 
same condition of our structurally situated presence to require the reciprocal exchange of per-
spectives for the constitution of objectivity. 
On these conditions, and freed from the prejudices surrounding it, the inquiry on struc-
tural invariants anticipates a radically new field of research of great scientific significance, if 
only one is able to sense the possibility of a systematic and rigorous analysis of what reveals 
itself common in human experiences. 
We shall try to show how this road, even though not thematised in phenomenological 
terms, was explored by Kelly in his psychological field of work, carrying out at least in part the 
task Husserl (1911) had assigned to a science of experience: “to recast the conjectures of pro-
fundity into unequivocal rational forms (Engl. transl., p. 195). 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  The expression originates from Merleau-Ponty (1945): “To return to things themselves is to return to 
that world which precedes knowledge, of which knowledge always speaks, and in relation to which every 
scientific schematization is an abstract and derivative sign-language, as is geography in relation to the 
country-side in which we have learnt beforehand what a forest, a prairie or a river is.” (Engl. transl., pp. 
ix-x)	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Husserl, Kelly, and psychology 
Husserl (1936) calls psychology “the decisive field” (Engl. transl., p. 203), since here, 
more than in other scientific fields, should become manifest the fundamental relationship be-
tween subjectivity and world, and the primacy of meanings. From psychology therefore he ex-
pected a significant answer to his project. 
 But even then only disappointments arrived from psychology: “the majority of psy-
chologists have not understood the already present beginnings of phenomenology, that often, in 
fact, they have even considered essential investigation carried out from a purely intuitive 
standpoint to be metaphysical abstraction of the scholastic variety” (Husserl, 1911, Engl. 
transl., p. 184). Maybe for the same reason, still today the majority of psychologists keeps on 
disregarding the Husserlian proposal. Right in the “decisive field”, the anchorage to naturalism 
has resisted beyond any evidence (Armezzani, 2012), notwithstanding the decline of such par-
adigm in other scientific realms. 
 Yet, Husserl’s criticism of psychology (a recurring theme in his writings) should still set 
us thinking. 
modern exact psychology, by the very fact that it considers itself as already methodically 
perfect and strictly scientific, is actually unscientific wherever it will pursue the sense of the 
psychical element that enters into psychophysical regularities, i.e., wherever it will penetrate 
to a real psychological understanding. (Husserl, 1911, Engl. transl., p. 175) 
Psychology, as long as puts itself as naturalistic science and keeps fastened to the “super-
stition of the fact” (Husserl, 1911, Engl. transl., p. 193), will not be able to account for psychic 
phenomena because it does not see them and recognise as such; because it deals with them as 
things of nature, loosing sight of its main task. 
How could that which is in principle the most essential escape it? How could psychology fail 
to see that in its purely psychological concepts, with which it now cannot at all dispense, it 
necessarily gives a content that is not simply taken from what is actually given in experience 
but is applied to the latter? (Husserl, 1911, Engl. transl., pp. 36-37) 
This is the same criticism that Kelly (1955) will address to his fellow psychologists, re-
sponsible for tying meanings to their assumptions (of behaviorism, psychoanalysis, or need 
theory) and accepting “the prior assumption of the inertness of psychological objects”. Kelly’s 
invitation too leads in an altogether different direction: “It seems time to reconsider this prior 
assumption and give life back to the person who lives it” (p. 37). 
Following this direction, psychology has a refounding task which can give it back its 
specificity. Psychology should pass from the study of the things of nature to the study of phe-
nomena. 
It must have acquired the necessary rigorous concepts by methodical work. Where is this 
methodical work accomplished in "exact" psychology? We seek for it in vain throughout its 
vast literature. (Husserl, 1911, Engl. transl., p. 177) 
Still today one could hardly find, within a literature which in the meantime has become 
endless, anything similar to what Husserl meant for “scientific foundation” of psychology: a 
rigorous knowledge of experience which can lead to clear definitions of phenomena and of 
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their typical relationships. Husserl’s project is still waiting for realisation, but our reading of 
Kelly is aimed at showing that such a work is possible. 
Though treading on another ground and having different cultural premises, Kelly shared 
with Husserl the rejection of a psychology which removes from “data” their reference to a 
subjectivity, and the need for a rigorous study of experience which can lead to a definition of 
its general forms. 
The first consequence of this common choice is the rediscovery of the intersubjective di-
mension in which research takes place, and the core importance of the other as the center of a 
field of signification, similar to mine, which has coessentially an epistemological and ethical 
value, too often disregarded by official psychology. For this reason, the sphere of human en-
counter is strongly enhanced both from constructivism (Chiari & Nuzzo, 2006) and phenome-
nology. The similarities between role relationship and phenomenological empathy will be one 
of the objects of the third part of the present contribution. For the time being, in reply to the 
charge of solipsism levelled also by Kelly to phenomenology, this recognition by Varela will 
be sufficient: 
One of the most impressive discoveries of the phenomenological movement is to have 
quickly realized that an investigation of the structure of human experience inevitably induces 
a shift toward considering several levels of my consciousness as inextricably linked to those 
of others and to the phenomenal world in an empathic mesh. (Varela, 1998, p. 37) 
Kellyan psychology as science of experience 
In introducing the autobiography of his theory, Kelly (1969/1963) tells to have very soon 
abandoned physiological psychology to look for a psychology closer to the human. Later on, 
he will abandon also psychoanalysis. The reason is the same: 
There must be something more than emotion, thought, and behavior that goes to make the 
man. To find this "something" is the challenge of psychology, though I doubt that very many 
psychologists see it this way. (Kelly, 1963/1969, p. 57) 
What we could call “phenomenological attitude” is well expressed by the dissatisfaction 
for established knowledge which prevents him from identifying with the main currents of 
American psychology, and by his sincere and firm rejection of obviousness: “I have even 
speculated that man's greatest challenge and noblest undertaking may be to transcend the obvi-
ous.” (1963/1969, p. 61). 
By taking up this research attitude Kelly constructs a formal theory which, as Bruner 
(1956) observed in a famous review, is the first attempt at elaborating a personality theory 
starting from a theory of knowledge. 
Kelly’s stance is well outlined at the beginning of his work and implies a viewpoint in-
deed hardly considered at his times: 
Sometimes scientists, particularly those who are engrossed in the study of physical systems, 
take the stand that psychological events are not true phenomena but are rather epiphenomena, 
or merely the unreliable shadows of real events. This position is not ours. A person may 
misrepresent a real phenomenon, such as his income or his ills, and yet his misrepresentation 
will itself be entirely real This applies even to the badly deluded patient: what he perceives 
may not exist, but his perception does. (Kelly, 1955, p. 8) 
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The passage reminds that of Husserl above quoted, where he pointed out that, from a 
phenomenologically point of view, the representation of god Jupiter is a phenomenon equiva-
lent to the perception of a real datum. It is a sharp and hard choice both for Husserl and Kelly, 
in favour of experience as subject-matter: the same choice made by Wundt (1896) when he 
founded psychology distinguishing it from the natural sciences, but that was very quickly dis-
carded by the predominance of behaviorism and the power of Freudian unconscious. 
On the contrary, Kelly (1955) speaks explicitly of experience as “a set of personally con-
strued events”, as “the extent of what we know” (p. 171), as “that portion of the universe which 
is happening to us” (p. 172). Experience definies itself, also for Kelly, as inextricable correla-
tion between knowing subject and fact. Psychological analysis takes therefore the form of the 
study of “meaningful events” and of “the way those events, in turn, are construed” (p. 172). 
In this sense Kelly (1963) connotes his psychology as “a disciplined psychology of the 
inner outlook” (p. 183)1, equally distant from the scientific psychologies of outer perspective 
and the experiential psychologies of inner feelings. By means of more present-day terms, we 
could say that his is a “second person” psychology, which opposes to the “third person” natu-
ralistic psychologies and the “first person” intimistic ones. 
The analysis of experience, if cannot be “external” research on facts, cannot even be only 
aimed at individual knowledge. This is a fundamental issue for the construction of a science, 
and this is the reason why Kelly, as we observed in the first part of the present contribution 
(Armezzani & Chiari, 2014), cares to distance himself from what he believes to be the phe-
nomenological stance. Paradoxically, however, the approach he suggests is very close to the 
definition of “structural invariants” of phenomena as advanced by Husserl. Kelly’s idea of a 
theory actually seems recognisable as the task of analysing and systematically arrange the 
forms which reveal themselves common in experience. According to Kelly (1955), a theory 
“is a tentative expression of what man has seen as a regular pattern in the surging events of 
life” (p. 19); should be aimed at “abstracting the scientific principles […] from our 
experiences as well as others'” (p. 23); “should be expressed in terms of abstractions which 
are of a sufficiently high order to be traced through nearly all of the phenomena with which 
psychology must deal.” (p. 27) 
As in phenomenology, a basic reconsideration of the idea of subjectivity is needed. If the 
subject-matter is experience, it is no longer possible to derive general principles from natural-
istic sciences, but it will be necessary to look for them in the very same place in which they 
manifest themselves: the subjective experience of any individual. 
The psychologist, too, when he describes a case, may be conducting an idiographic study; 
but if the description is to have any thread of meaning running through it, he must relate his 
selection of relevant facts to principles of human behavior. The principles, of course, may be 
derived within a realm no larger than the individual case, but they are still principles – they 
are abstractions of events. (Kelly, 1955, p. 42) 
If one reads again the last lines of the above quotation, the continuity with the hard idea 
of phenomenology which, coming back to experience, ties again in a recursive circle singular-
ity and generality, should clearly reveal itself. The realisation of a science of experience ap-	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1 Though the edition published in 1963 is supposed to consist of the first three chapters of Kelly’s two-
volume work, we chanced upon some revisions in the text. This quotation is in chapter 3, § 23 
(Conclusion), not present in the original edition.	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pears to dissolve spontaneously, even in Kelly’s words, the contradiction between the idio-
graphic and the nomothetic: in order to obtain general principles, it is not necessary to deprive 
events of their ambience of meaning. Quite the opposite, we can see regularities and structural 
relations constituting the “principles,” the “intentional laws” of psychic life, by accepting 
meaning in its singular manifestations. Phenomenological reflection can now help us to re-
move also the seeming contradiction to which Kelly exposes himself when defining his psy-
chology as a “psychology of the inner outlook” and, at the same time, as a nomothetic science. 
When the subject-matter is experience, the separation between scientific knowledge and per-
sonal knowledge is no more needed, because “the individual, phenomenologically, is always 
typical” (Paci, 1961, p. 141, translation ours). 
The understanding of meanings can happen only through the intersubjective encounter, 
and this very same understanding allows us, then, to grasp invariant structures and, as Husserl 
said, “permit, at least to a very great extent, of being fixed in definitive concepts” (Husserl, 
1911, Engl. transl., p. 111). Kelly articulates his thought in a similar manner: 
each study of an individual becomes a problem in concept formation for the psychologist. 
After he has conceptualized each of his cases, he next has the task of further abstracting the 
individual constructs in order to produce constructs which underlie people in general. (Kelly, 
1955, p. 43) 
This is therefore the task of a psychological theory: not to distance itself from the prob-
lem which any subjective experience poses for the calculating reason with its confusion of 
meanings, but to try to catch the typical forms and their relations through a recursive circle of 
particolarities and generalities. 
While arguing about statistical generalisation, Kelly believes it is more important to refer 
to lived experience of any single individual in order to grasp the “essential features” (1955, p. 
42), instead of looking for data in groups of individuals. In a similar way Merleau-Ponty 
(1945) expresses himself when saying that statistical thought “is not thought at all, since it does 
not concern any particular thing actually existing, any moment of time, any concrete event” 
(Engl. transl., p. 513). And, one could add, any meaning. 
 To make a classical example, the statistically significant correlation between the 
measures of frustration and aggression finds its reason in the understandable relationship link-
ing the two phenomena and implicit in it. In the science of experience – in phenomenology and 
in PCT – even the concept of scientific prediction changes its sign and is reconsidered as an-
ticipation of what “sensibly” promises to be by starting from meanings. I do not expect that a 
frustrated person reacts with aggression because psychological tests measuring the two varia-
bles present a high correlation in scores, but, having come to know the meaning of frustration 
and having investigated its “essential relationship” with aggression, I can anticipate that this 
essential correlation manifests itself also in other cases. The variation of examples does not go 
in the direction of the quantity of data, but in that of the depth of experience, where what is 
more common and shared is hidden. 
Kellyan theory as world of forms 
“Essence”, eidos, means “form”, and derives from the Greek verb ὁράω with the mean-
ing of “to see”. The general forms deriving from experience are a sort of evidences we derive 
from our lived experience and our understanding of the lived experience of other people. 
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In order that these forms manifest themselves it is however necessary that we rid our-
selves of all the mental schemata and prejudices which prevent their appearance. This recom-
mendation of phenomenology finds confirmation in Kelly’s (1955) psychology, which is real-
ised in the attempt at understanding one’s own and others’ experience by accepting it “as it 
stands” (p. 587), “directed toward the tendency for psychologists to impose preemptive con-
structions upon human behavior” (p. 775). Even though it can seem hazardous to equate 
Kellyan “credulous approach” to Husserlian phenomenological epoché as Butt (2003) suggests, 
the whole Kelly’s work can be read as a firm stance against naïve realism in favour of experi-
ence. 
This is exactly the aspect which distinguishes it from classical psychological theories: re-
ports are not conducted from the viewpoint of the third person, but from within the experience 
itself. The creation of all his theory takes as method the analysis of meanings, and arrives to 
the formulation of one postulate and eleven corollaries consistent with each other, without 
commenting specific contents, but only typical forms and their relationships. 
There are no theoretical constructs placed from the outside to the subjective lived experi-
ence in the attempt at explaining people and their functioning (what commonly happens in 
psychological theories), but the how of experience is outlined, expressing the formal regularity 
abstracted from single events. We dare say that the definition of postulate and corollaries has 
derived implicitly by a continuous variation of examples which allowed to grasp the general 
forms underpinning the single “cases”. Clinical experience, from this point of view, can be re-
read as an incessant exercise of free variations, not calling for a separation between scientific 
and personal knowledge, but which proposes to keep together and harmonise the two moments 
of knowledge. 
 Even though Kelly did not expressely say how arrived to the formulation of his theory, 
one can credit what he himself asserts: 
Wherever man is struggling mightily to make something of himself there is a fertile place for 
the researcher to be. […] In my own case this has meant nearly thirty-five years of part-time 
service as a psychotherapist-not because feeling useful was the primary reward I sought but 
because I knew of no better way to bring all my resources to bear on the problems of 
scientific psychology with which I had undertaken to cope. (Kelly, 1964/1969, p. 131) 
Science must pass through the real experience of single subjects, and only from this di-
rect knowledge can draw its general forms. The formal organisation of Kellyan theory seems to 
realise Husserl’s (1911) call to psychology towards an analysis of experience able to extract 
from it the structural invariants “and thereby afford possibilities of definitive and in their own 
way absolutely valid objective statements” (Engl. transl., p. 181). This is indeed a sort of geog-
raphy of experience constructed starting from the landscape and, given its clinical purposes, 
destined to return continuously there in order to validate its usefulness. 
All this is particularly manifest in the definition of the transitions. Transitions, which in 
Kelly’s intention cover the sphere of “emotional” experiences dissolving the classical distinc-
tion between emotion and cognition (Chiari, 2013), are ways to live change expressed in their 
general structure. 
Let us take guilt as an example. This transition is defined as the “perception of one's ap-
parent dislodgment from his core role structure” (Kelly, 1955, p. 502). The formal definition is 
again about experience: that of whom does no longer recognises him/herself as the person 
he/she believed to be, an experience which can happen to all of us, each time filled of personal 
contents. It can be lived by the person who committed a violent crime while considering 
him/herself gentle, or by the heartless Unnamed in the night of his conversion in Manzoni’s 
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The Betrothed (1842), when he can’t understand how it is possible that he experiences a feeling 
of pity. What remains invariant in the variation of contents is the structure of guilt, that feeling 
of non-correspondence of one’s own actions with the most core self-image. The definition 
obeys the conditions established by Husserl for the search of general forms: 
It then becomes evident that a unity runs through this multiplicity of successive figures, that 
in such free variations of an original image, e.g., of a thing, an invariant is necessarily 
retained as the necessary general form, without which an object such as this thing, as an 
example of its kind, would not be thinkable at all. (Husserl, 1948, Engl. transl., p. 341) 
All the particular cases in which it is possible to recognise the general form (in this case, 
guilt) are as a consequence “arbitrary particularizations of the one eidos” (1948, Engl. transl., 
p. 341). 
The formal knowledge of this experience has however a practical effect: it allows the cli-
nician to understand the person who lives it and, moreover, to anticipate some typical relation-
ships between guilt and other phenomena, like hostility, constriction, aggressiveness, thus sug-
gesting intervention strategies. 
Each professional construct described in Kelly’s theory obeys to this formal criterion. To 
say that a construct is preemptive, just to make another example, means to describe how that 
construct is used by the person at a level of formal abstraction, without the necessity of pro-
nouncing on specific contents. 
The whole Kellyan theory can be read as the construction of a world of forms consist-
ently connected and organised in a system, a “mathesis of lived experiences” arising from the 
study of experience and which must necessarily come back to experience in order to determine 
its validity. Maybe Kelly, who would have never accepted an interpretation of his theory in 
terms of “essences”, would have agreed with this analogy to which he himself resorted (Kelly, 
1961/1969). The fact that both Husserl and Kelly come from a former mathematical education 
can have had a role in their common tendency to look for pure forms able to give order to the 
chaos of events. What shares them even more deeper however is their passion for experience, 
the intention not to loose sight of the place of origin of those forms. 
A case of commonality 
One of the corollaries of Kelly’s (1955) theory, the Commonality Corollary, reads: “to 
the extent that one person employs a construction of experience which is similar to that em-
ployed by another, his psychological processes are similar to those of the other person” (p. 90). 
If we try to apply this general form of experience to the specific case of Husserl and Kelly, we 
could confirm that “two persons may be using essentially the same constructions of their expe-
rience, although they express themselves in quite different terms” (p. 92). 
Notwithstanding the difference of their original cultures, of the traditions settled in read-
ings, and of their specific professional fields, Husserl and Kelly share some basic ways of con-
struing experience and derive from them convergent scientific implications, without ever hav-
ing been in touch. This confirms the idea that a similar look at reality implies a likeness in the 
practical consequences and choices, which that look opens ahead. 
The Commonality Corollary however does not conflict with that of Individuality. We 
tried here to highlight the aspects of commonality between Husserl and Kelly in the construc-
tion of the scientific view, the subject-matter, and the working method; nevertheless, insupera-
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ble differences we invite not to underestimate remain and distinguish the work of these au-
thors. 
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